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I agree that someone’s lack of mental capacity, or their inability to make proper choices, as I would prefer,
has an intuitive moral force as a criterion for coercing them to accept care.2 The authors of “A Model
Law Fusing Incapacity and Mental Health Legislation” (henceforth AML) are right also, I think, when
they suggest that this moral force is reflected in the law’s widespread use of “choice based” criteria to
determine when and to what degree a medical patient’s stated wishes will be respected. I also agree that
bad legislation can contribute to the stigmatization of the mentally ill. 
As AML points out, mental health legislation has to incorporate many principles, some of which are in
tension with each other. AML uses, as an example, the balance that has to be achieved between
maximizing patient autonomy, on the one hand, and ensuring their safety and that of others, on the other.
An essential principle in mental health legislation is that mentally disordered offenders need treatment
and that the law should seek to ensure that they get it. As would be the case for any law, other principles
will need to be respected too; but this one seems crucial. I am not convinced that the need to ensure




The Introduction to AML states that the proposals use the “usual” definition of incapacity, one that
includes, “the inability to reach a decision that is sufficiently stable for it to be followed”. This definition
may be usual in other jurisdictions, but it is not the one employed in England and Wales. The Mental
Capacity Act 2005 provides a test with four elements: understanding information, retaining that
information, using or weighing information, and communicating a decision. In this respect the Act is
consistent with an earlier literature that includes the Law Commission’s “Mental Incapacity”3 and the
1 Associate Professor, Law and Psychiatry, Yale University Department of Psychiatry, 34 Park Street, New Haven, CT 06519,
USA. The author thanks Drs. Adrian Grounds, Tim Exworthy and Simon Wilson and Professor John Gunn.
2 Buchanan A (2002) ‘Psychiatric detention and treatment: a suggested criterion’. Journal of Mental Health Law 35-41.
3 Law Commission (1995) Mental Incapacity. Law Commission No. 231 HMSO: London.
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green and white papers, “Who Decides”4 and “Making Decisions”.5
The difference is important because capacity fluctuates. More specifically, the illnesses that interfere with
the ability to make a proper choice do so by virtue of symptoms and signs and those symptoms and signs
vary over time, both in nature and intensity. Other legislative approaches to the problems of mental ill
health, as the authors point out, make coercion contingent on the presence of “mental disorder” and a
“risk of harm”. While these terms carry their own problems of definition, and while “mental disorder” and
“risk” each have their quantitative aspects, as currently interpreted they do not seem to fluctuate to the
same extent as any legally defined “capacity”. One still has schizophrenia even after one’s symptoms have
resolved with treatment. As a result, patients and services can make their plans in the knowledge of what
the patient’s legal status is likely to be and some consistency in treatment becomes possible.
By contrast, intuitive moral forces notwithstanding and as one of the authors of AML has pointed out
elsewhere,
“Respecting immediately the right to refuse treatment of patients who regain their capacity to consent
after initial medication may mean that patients whose capacity fluctuates never receive the sustained
treatment that they need.”6
The implications of this for capacity-based approaches to mental health law are substantial. The problem
is not solved by simply including, “the inability to reach a decision that is sufficiently stable for it to be
followed,” in the definition of incapacity because the hard question then becomes what is “sufficiently
stable”. In any case, AML is arguing that it is not the stability of the decision that is morally important,
but the quality of the process by which the decision is made.
Nor do usual definitions of capacity include the requirement that appears here under clause 3 (1) (c),
that in order to have capacity a patient must, not just “understand”, but “appreciate” the information
relevant to a decision. The change in wording may have important consequences. The substitution of
“appreciate” for “know” probably increased the availability of the insanity defense in the United States.7
Here, as AML points out, it would restrict the number of people found to have capacity. The change
seems also to be a potential source of argument. Those advocating detention will presumably suggest that
a patient’s willingness to ignore medical advice is, in and of itself, evidence that they are unable to
appreciate fully the implications of their decisions.
Details of the proposed provision
Clause 45 (2) of AML makes provision for those found insane or unfit to plead to be treated compulsorily
even when they have capacity. Surprisingly, given the importance that the proposals attach to patient
choice, an order to permit this can be made even if the offence is not serious. Clause 45 requires the
offence to be punishable by imprisonment, but this would cover a large number of crimes including
“threatening behavior” and “failing to answer bail”.
Clause 45 (4) requires that the same patients be released where the order is either a) no longer necessary
for the protection of others or b) has become “disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence with
4 Lord Chancellor’s Department (1997) Who Decides. Cm 3803 HMSO: London.
5 Lord Chancellor’s Department (1999) Making Decisions. Cm4465 HMSO: London.
6 Dawson J and Kämpf A (2006) ‘Incapacity principles in mental health laws in Europe’. Psychology, Public Policy and Law 12,
310-331, at 312
7 American Bar Association (1989) Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards American Bar Association: Washington DC,
U.S, pp. 321–347.
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which P was charged”. It is not unusual for someone charged with a minor offence to be regarded,
clinically and by courts, as presenting a substantial risk: half of Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP)
sentences have had a tariff of less than 20 months.8 In such a case the Tribunal will be faced with what
amounts to a sentencing decision, deciding what is “proportionate”, without having available the
information which a court has when it passes a sentence. Where the patient has regained capacity and a
Compulsory Treatment Order under clause 34 is, therefore, not available, the Tribunal will have to make
this decision in circumstances where only by declaring the order “proportionate” can it protect the public. 
Numerically, the most important question is what would happen to the 750 – 800 cases who are admitted
annually to hospital under s.37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA 1983).9 The answer seems to be
that they would either a) receive a prison sentence and then go to hospital (clause 43 of AML) under
arrangements similar to the present “hospital direction” under s.45 A of the MHA 1983 or b) receive a
treatment order (under clause 44 of AML) which could be discharged either by the responsible clinician
or by the Tribunal. Under an “alternative position”, described in the Introduction but not in the draft
statute, the convicted mentally disordered could, again, be made subject to a hospital order for a period,
“proportionate to the seriousness of their offence” provided that their mental condition had “contributed
significantly” to what they did.
Since the “alternative position” is not included in the draft statute I will not dwell on it here. I would note,
however, that establishing when a mental disorder does or does not “contribute” to the commission of a
criminal offence has occupied U.S. criminal jurisprudence for many years, with little sign of resolution.10 I
would note also that keeping people in hospital, irrespective of their clinical condition, for a period
proportionate to the seriousness of an offence is bound to distort clinical care and that many clinicians will
be concerned about the ethics of recommending an order that formalizes such an arrangement. 
The option of a treatment order that can be discharged by the responsible clinician (clause 44) is unlikely
to interest the criminal courts when the offence is a serious one. Simply put, they will worry that the
defendant could shortly be back on the street, untreated and unsupervised. This means that for mentally
disordered offenders convicted on serious charges the consequences of AML would be similar to the
making of a “hospital direction” under current provision. I discuss the implications in the next section.
The model statute makes no provision for people with capacity to receive supervised treatment in the
community, as is presently provided for in the Mental Health Act 1983 by community treatment orders
(s. 17A) and orders for the conditional discharge of restricted patients (s. 42(2) & s. 73(2)) A patient
who regained capacity would have to be discharged from compulsion. Nor is there provision for increasing
the level of scrutiny in serious cases, as happens elsewhere in medicine.11 At present, Mental Health
Tribunals in restricted cases are chaired by Queen’s Counsel or a circuit judge as a, “safeguard for the
public interest”.12 Clause 48 of AML describes two-level tribunals but the upper level, like the Upper
Tribunal created by the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, seems to deal primarily with appeals.
8 ‘In the Dark. The Mental Health Implications of
Imprisonment for Public Protection’, Sainsbury Centre for
Mental Health, London (2008).
9 Health and Social Care Information Centre (2008) 
In-patients Formally Detained in Hospitals under the
Mental Health Act 1983 and other Legislation, England:
1997–98 to 2007–08 NHS Information Centre: Leeds.
10 Buchanan A and Zonana H (2009) ‘Mental disorder as
the cause of a crime’. International Journal of Law and
Psychiatry 32, 142–146
11 Buchanan A (2004) ‘Mental capacity, legal competence
and consent to treatment’. Journal of the Royal Society of
Medicine 97, 415–20.
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Jordans, p224
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General considerations
Imprisonment is not treatment
Any mental health law has to choose its “legislative posture” with respect to the criminal law. AML
suggests that difficulties will be minimized if mental health legislation adopts some of the principles of
criminal justice. The justification offered for allowing the seriousness of the offence to govern how long
someone should spend in hospital, for example, is that this would represent, “a pragmatic response to
society’s demand that a person who has committed a serious offence – even with a mental disorder, and
even one that might respond rapidly to treatment – should be detained for a proportionate time.”
IPP sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 seem to move criminal justice away from this ‘just
desserts’ approach to proportionality. But I am not sure that it is necessary to invoke criminal justice
principles in any case. With respect to mentally ill people who have committed serious offences, the
primary concern of politicians and of the public is the same as the primary concern of clinicians. Sick
people should receive the treatment they need and not leave hospital without arrangements to ensure
first, that they can continue to receive it and, second, that risk has been addressed. If this does not
happen, and someone re-offends, I cannot see that society will be comforted to be told that, at some
earlier point, that person had been detained for a proportionate period.
The Butler Committee described what it thought was the correct legislative posture. Where a hospital
order is made, the Committee wrote, the patient, 
“is being removed from the penal process; it is being decided not to punish him. The possibility of his
early discharge must be taken into account by the court. If necessary for the protection of the public
a restriction order should also be imposed … or a prison sentence may be indicated,”13
The Committee emphasized also the need for the receiving hospital to agree to whatever order was being
made. This is an important and complicated area that would ideally be addressed in any review of forensic
provision. It may be that present provision has allowed clinicians inappropriately to “gate-keep”,14 thereby
reducing the number of mentally disordered offenders being admitted.
Two aspects of the Butler Committee’s analysis seem particularly relevant to the suggestions contained in
AML. First, as the Mental Health Act Commission has since reiterated,15 there is value in making a clear
distinction between treatment and punishment. The Butler Committee considered whether, in making a
hospital order, the sentencing court might, “simultaneously impose a prison sentence as an alternative, to
be served if the offender proved unresponsive to treatment or not to need treatment” (at 188). The
possibility they were considering was very similar to clause 43 of AML and its “hospital order with a
concurrent sentence”. The Committee concluded that: “It seems to us undesirable that the court should
not clearly decide, in so important a matter as the loss of a man’s liberty, between a punitive sentence and
an order for medical treatment” (at 189). The Committee noted also that it seemed “illogical and
inappropriate” to send a patient to prison if he improved with treatment and that the prospect was
unlikely to encourage anyone to cooperate.
13 Home Office and Department of Health and Social Security (1975) Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal
Offenders. Cmnd. 6244 HMSO: London (at 189).
14 Grounds A (2008) ‘The end of faith in forensic psychiatry’. Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health 18, 1–13.
15 Mental Health Act Commission (2006) In Place of Fear. Eleventh Biennial Report 2003 – 2005 The Stationery Office:
London.
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Experience of the “hospital direction” under s.45 (A) of the MHA 1983 suggests that these concerns
persist. Only 30 such orders were made in the six years to the end of 2008, as against 3,999 orders under
s.37 over the same period.16 Part of the reason for the discrepancy may be unfamiliarity on the part of
courts, lawyers and psychiatrists with legislation that is relatively recent. It is also possible that use of s.
45 (A) will increase following its amendment in 2007; hospital directions can now be applied to anyone
with a “disorder or disability of mind”, and not just the “psychopathically disordered”. But psychiatrists
were concerned at the prospect of such an amendment when the order was introduced,17 and the change
may not affect the number of orders made.
Second, the criminal courts are more likely to allow mentally disordered offenders who have committed
serious crimes to go to hospital where those courts are confident that the public is being protected. In
over half of the cases where a hospital order was made in 2007–8 the courts chose to add a restriction
order.18 Hospital is not the only alternative open to the courts. Where they do not see any other means
of ensuring public safety they can send mentally disordered offenders to prison.
In addition to adopting an appropriate posture towards the criminal law, mental health statutes should
foster the ethical practice of medicine. At present, at the sentencing stage of a criminal proceeding a
doctor can testify to the clinical needs of the patient, and whether treatment in a hospital is appropriate.
The court can then impose a restriction order if it feels that this is necessary to ensure the protection of
the public. Lawyers can still ask a psychiatrist whether this would be a good thing, but the distinction in
roles, between doctor and court, means that the doctor can answer in clinical terms and the court can
reach a legal conclusion.
The situation envisioned by AML is likely to be more difficult for the psychiatrist. If the offence is minor,
he or she might reasonably offer treatment on a treatment order under clause 44. If the offence is serious,
however, the only option under AML that the court would be likely to accept would be that of the
“hospital order with concurrent sentence” under clause 43. The psychiatrist would, presumably, be asked
about prognosis and risk. The answers would be used by the court to set the length of the sentence. 
The psychiatrist would then be in a predicament, the prospect of which may have contributed to the lack
of enthusiasm for s.45 A. He or she will effectively be recommending not just a prison sentence, but 
its length.19
Risk is not exclusively forensic
The commentary to AML states that different principles need to be applied in the forensic field in order
to protect the public. The model statute itself reflects this belief, drawing a clear line between forensic
patients, in respect of whom “some modification of pure capacity principles may be required”, and other
clients of psychiatric services. The modification will apply to four groups: those on remand facing criminal
charges, found unfit to plead, found legally “insane” or convicted of a criminal offence. All other patients
will require to be released if they regain capacity, irrespective of whether they present a risk to themselves
or others.
16 Health and Social Care Information Centre (2008) In-
patients Formally Detained in Hospitals under the Mental
Health Act 1983 and other Legislation, England:
1997–98 to 2007–08 NHS Information Centre: Leeds.
17 Eastman N (1996) ‘Hybrid orders: an analysis of their
likely effects on sentencing practice and on forensic
psychiatric practice and services’. Journal of Forensic
Psychiatry 7, 481–494.
18 Health and Social Care Information Centre (2008) In-
patients Formally Detained in Hospitals under the Mental
Health Act 1983 and other Legislation, England:
1997–98 to 2007–08 NHS Information Centre: Leeds.
19 Walker N (1996) ‘Hybrid orders’. Journal of Forensic
Psychiatry 7, 469–472.
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Whether this will be acceptable to lawmakers must be open to doubt. From the perspective of a
commentary on the forensic aspects of the proposals I would point out only that risk of harm to others is
not restricted to forensic populations as defined by AML. Nine percent of the high secure hospital
population in England and Wales are detained on non-forensic treatment orders under s.3 of the MHA
1983.20 For the medium secure population, the figure rises to over 20%.21 There will be many other
“risky” non-forensic patients who will be excluded by these criteria. In London, 10% of detained
psychiatric patients appear to have sufficient capacity to make other medical decisions22 and would
presumably require to be released.
Also importantly, a group of psychiatric patients will be made subject to different criteria for coercion for
reasons that are unrelated to their clinical condition. This happens to some extent at present, of course:
the criteria for a hospital order under s.37 are not identical to those for admission under s.3. But the
differences are much more marked under AML. This aspect of the proposals seems to be at odds with the
“non-discriminatory” thrust of the Introduction. I am not sure that the problems of stigma, as they apply
to psychiatric patients as a whole, can be addressed by hiving off some of those who are seen as presenting
a risk to others. And I would be concerned that attempting to do so in the way that is proposed by AML
could create an even more stigmatized forensic population.
Alternatives
These difficulties in fitting forensic provision into an overarching theory need not prevent the application
of capacity principles in particular contexts. The Richardson Committee, while advocating an incapacity
criterion for compulsion under the MHA, included an exception for those presenting “substantial risk of
serious harm”.23 Other European jurisdictions also apply capacity and other principles simultaneously.24
In England and Wales, the making of a hospital order, with or without restrictions, on a defendant with
capacity could be made to require the defendant’s consent.25
The rights of a defendant with capacity would then be respected because he would be able to choose
whether or not to accept treatment. Public safety concerns would be respected because the defendant
would be making the choice at the sentencing stage of the proceedings when the court could make an
alternative disposal, including imprisonment, if the defendant did not want to be admitted to hospital.
The law would then need to permit re-sentencing if the convicted defendant subsequently changed his
mind. The Butler Committee considered reference back to the sentencing court or to the Court of Appeal
where a hospital order had been made but where it subsequently became apparent that the patient did
not intend to cooperate. The Committee rejected this course because they thought that the interim
hospital order would address the problem. It may not have.26,27
20 Harty M, Shaw J, Thomas S, Dolan M, Davies L,
Thornicroft G, Carlisle J, Moreno M, Leese M, Appleby
L, Jones P (2004) ‘The security, clinical and social needs
of patients in high security psychiatric hospital in England’.
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology 15,
208–221.
21 Coid J, Kahtan N, Gault S, Cook A and Jarman B
(2001) ‘Medium secure forensic psychiatry services.
Comparison of seven English health regions’. British
Journal of Psychiatry 178, 55–61.
22 Cairns R, Maddock C, Buchanan A, David A, Hayward
P, Richardson G. Szmukler G, Hotopf M. (2005)
‘Prevalence and predictors of mental incapacity in
psychiatric in-patients’. British Journal of Psychiatry 187,
379–385.
23 Department of Health (1999) Report of the Expert
Committee: Review of the Mental Health Act HMSO:
London.
24 Dawson J and Kämpf A (2006) ‘Incapacity principles in
mental health laws in Europe’. Psychology, Public Policy
and Law 12, 310–331, at 312
25 Buchanan A (2007) ‘Correspondence. Mental health and
incapacity legislation’. British Journal of Psychiatry 190,
176–177.
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Catering for patients changing their minds is more laborious than failing to do so, but it is an inevitable
consequence of respecting their choices. If capacity principles are to be introduced into forensic
psychiatric practice the issue will have to be addressed more generally. Forensic care can be long-term and
involve several changes of service. It is one thing to agree to treatment in one’s local regional secure unit
but quite another to agree to live in a high-secure hospital. Clinicians are not going to be able to
guarantee what lies in store. Some provision for review and reconsideration will be required.
Because compliance is often partial, there would still be cases under such a “hospital order with consent”
where the doctor’s subsequent decision, that a failure to participate in treatment amounted to withdrawal
of that consent, would be seen as declaring the patient “fit for punishment”.28 Such a scheme would also
have to overcome objections that s.37 of the Act already provides an efficient way of getting treatment
to people who need it, resources permitting. But by making the court-ordered treatment of a defendant
who has capacity dependent on that defendant’s willingness to accept treatment the scheme would bring
care of the mentally disordered more into line with that of patients elsewhere in medicine while
addressing some of the additional discrimination that forensic patients seem otherwise likley to suffer
under AML’s capacity umbrella.
Conclusion
Two aspects of current provision that are not contained in AML seem particularly important and should
be preserved in any new legal framework. First, the MHA 1983 has a clinical emphasis. The Act contains
no reference to detention proportionate to the seriousness of an offence, no reference to whether a
mental condition contributed significantly to what happened and no requirement that a court pass a
sentence that will determine what happens when the patient leaves hospital. Instead, it permits the
passing of a hospital order where it is appropriate for the patient to be in a hospital, where treatment is
available and where such an order is the most suitable way of dealing with the case. This embodies a level
of judicial and medical discretion. Most importantly, it emphasises clinical need.
Second, the MHA 1983 offers an alternative to a court that is considering sending a mentally disordered
offender to prison. It offers this alternative while allowing additional steps to be taken to protect the
public if the court chooses to send the offender to hospital. These steps include a restriction order that
allows judicial scrutiny (but not judicial criteria) at tribunal hearings and recall to hospital if community
treatment proves unsafe. They also include an increased level of scrutiny in serious cases. Mental health
legislation should encourage courts to permit mentally disordered offenders to receive treatment. 
By adopting the correct legislative posture, it can do this without compromising the medical principles
essential to the proper provision of care. 
26 Mawson D (1983) ‘Psychopaths in special hospitals’. Bulletin of the Royal College of Psychiatrists 7, 178–181.
27 Grounds A (1987) ‘Detention of ‘Psychopathic Disorder’ patients in special hospitals. Critical issues’. British Journal of
Psychiatry 151, 474–478.
28 Mullen P, Briggs S, Dalton T, Burt M (2000) ‘Forensic mental health services in Australia’. International Journal of Law and
Psychiatry 23, 433–452.
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